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Remarks of Professor John F. Murphy*
I'm delighted to be here. Unfortunately I arrived last night so I've not
had the kind of tour that Tom Franck enjoyed, and I'm going to have to
leave this evening, so I'll not have an opportunity to really explore
Nashville.
This is my first visit to Vanderbilt, although I have been aware of the
fine international law program that Professors Maier and Charney have
run here. I've also been long aware of the excellent Journal, and you are
to be congratulated on how well this conference has been organized.
It's also a great pleasure to be among old friends. Those of us who
have labored in this field for some time are occassionally referred to as
the "antiterrorist industry;" indeed, some might accuse us of trying to
make the world safe for terrorism. Tom Franck has been sort of in and
out of this field. It's good to have his wisdom brought to bear on these
problems, and I'm going to refer to Tom's interesting and provocative
speech in my remarks this morning.
I have been asked to address the topic of legal responses to state sponsored terrorism. As has been mentioned, I am chairing an American Society of International Law Committee on Responses to State Sponsored
Terrorism. You may be interested to know that the mandate from the
president of the American Society of International Law, Keith Highet,
said that we should focus our attention on responses other than the use
of armed force. I think that was wise, because the members of that particular committee would never agree in any way on the subject of military responses to terrorism. I will discuss military responses to terrorism
very briefly in my remarks.
Let me tell you what I intend to do in the time that is allotted to me. I
will first distinguish between private acts of international terrorism that
have no state involvement, much less state sponsorship, and state spon* Remarks delivered to the Symposium on State Sponsored International Terrorism,
held at the Vanderbilt University School of Law on March 27, 1987. Professor Murphy
teaches at Villanova University School of Law. He is an active member of the American
Society of International Law, having served as co-director of the Panel on Legal Aspects
of International Terrorism from 1975 to 1980 and is currently serving as Chairman of
the Committee on Responses to State Sponsored Terrorism. Professor Murphy has
published extensively in the areas of international terrorism, international and domestic
security and human rights.
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sorship of acts of terrorism. I will then discuss some definitional
problems, both of terrorism, and of state sponsorship of terrorism and
address some of the points Tom Franck raised in his talk. Next, I will
turn to possible responses to international terrorism. Responses to terrorism fall along a spectrum from the least coercive to the most coercive.
They include the following general categories: First and least coercive, is
quiet diplomacy; second, is public protest; third, is the bringing of international and transnational claims, that is, claims that are brought in
United States courts but that have a transnational dimension to them;
fourth, a topic that Ken Abbott will discuss in more detail later, is economic sanctions; and fifth, is military force.
To begin, a distinction needs to be drawn between private acts of international terrorism and acts of international terrorism that involve state
sponsorship. If only private acts of international terrorism are present,
we have basically a criminal law problem with an international dimension. Here we find issues of jurisdiction over the crime and of international cooperation, some of the issues Jordan Paust addressed in his
remarks.
By contrast, with state sponsored terrorism, instead of cooperating to
combat terrorism, states use terrorism to further their interests. With
state sponsored terrorism, the primary concern is not criminal law but
relations between the victim state and the state sponsoring the terrorism.
This, in turn, involves international law norms that place constraints on
the use of violence and raises issues similar to those found in the law of
armed conflict, namely, what tactics are impermissible regardless of how
just the cause is. State sponsorship of terrorism also raises the issue of
possible violations of the United Nations Charter, particularly article
2(4), which prohibits threats or the use of force against the territorial
integrity and political independence of states.
I'd like to turn now to some definitional questions. Definitional
problems have constituted the most serious barrier to effective action in
dealing with terrorism, whether it be private acts of individual terrorism
or state sponsored acts of terrorism. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs
Walter Laqueur of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, a leading commentator, stated that between 1936 and
1981 there were 109 different definitions of terrorism advanced.' He also
pointed out that during recent years the United States Government has
advanced at least six different definitions.
The late Richard Baxter, formerly of Harvard University and a judge

1.

Laqueur, Reflections on Terrorism, 65

FOREIGN AFF.

86, 88 (1986).
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on the International Court of Justice, once made an apt comment on the
definitional problem. He said, "We have cause to regret that a legal concept of terrorism was ever inflicted upon us. The term is imprecise, it is
ambiguous, and, above all, it serves no operative legal purpose." In practice, "terrorism" has been used as a label to pin on one's enemies. This
is demonstrated by the well-known cliche that "one man's terrorist is
another man's freedom fighter." Ideally, I would suggest that we renounce use of the term "terrorism." I realize, however, that this is not
going to happen. Nonetheless, for purposes of legal analysis, we should
put the term "terrorism" aside and focus instead on acts that should be
regarded as illegal under any circumstances whatsoever.
To the extent that the United Nations has made some progress in
dealing with terrorism, it has done so by simply avoiding the problem of
defining international terrorism. As you probably know, the United Nations and its specialized agencies have adopted a variety of so-called antiterrorist conventions. These include three conventions in the civil aviation area that proscribe aircraft hijacking and sabotage and treat these
acts as international crimes subject to universal jurisdiction.2 There is
also a convention proscribing attacks on so-called internationally protected persons, that is, diplomats and other persons such as heads of state
enjoying immunity.' I might note parenthetically that some commentators have pointed out that it is no surprise that diplomats would get
together in the United Nations and draft a convention making it a crime
to attack diplomats. Along the same lines, there are conventions against
hostage-taking and the theft of nuclear material in transit.4 The latter

convention addresses the possibility of terrorists getting hold of nuclear
material.
These conventions do not speak in terms of terrorism. Their drafters
decided, for a variety of reasons, that hijackings of airplanes, attacks on
airplanes, attacks on internationally protected persons, hostage-taking
and the theft of nuclear material in transit are to be regarded as imper-

2. Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570; Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860

U.N.T.S. 105; Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.

3. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
4. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 39) at 23, U.N. DOC. A/34/39 (1979); Convention on the Physical Protection of

Nuclear Material, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1980, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1419
(1979).
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missible and that a state party which apprehends a person committing
such acts should be required either to extradite the person to a state
having jurisdiction over the crime or to submit the person to its own
prosecutorial authorities for purposes of prosecution.
I would like now to consider the hypothetical that Tom Franck raised
about individuals assassinating Hitler and fleeing to Holland. Assuming
both Germany and Holland were parties to a convention making assassination an international crime, the convention would oblige Holland either to extradite these individuals to Germany or to submit them to the
appropriate authorities for prosecution. Obviously Holland would choose
the latter course of action, and I think it is fair to say that those authorities would exercise prosecutorial discretion in deciding not to bring an
action. Alternatively, if the perpetrators of the assassination were tried
and convicted, the penalty imposed would be very minor indeed.
But the basic issue is whether we should, as the sophist would suggest,
regard assassination as legally permissible under certain circumstances
and, if so, whether we should adopt this proposition as a matter of law
in the form of legislation or a treaty. In my view, there is a grave danger
in adopting such a proposition as a legal concept because this would
open loopholes to the fundamental prohibition against assassination.
Clever lawyers could use such a loophole to justify assassinations of more
questionable morality than that of Hitler.
To illustrate the problem further, consider the aircraft hijacking situation. The approach taken in the aircraft hijacking conventions is, I suppose, to use Tom Franck's term, idiots' law, but it includes the extradite
or prosecute alternative as I mentioned. A particularly interesting example of a bilateral anti-aircraft hijacking convention is the United StatesCuba Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of Aircraft and
Vessels and Other Offenses [the Memorandum]. 5 It provides that if any
person hijacks an aircraft or vessel registered under the law of one party
to the territory of another party, the party whose territory the hijacker
reached shall either return the hijacker to the party of registry or bring
the hijacker before its courts for trial in conformity with its laws for the
offense punishable by the most severe penalty according to the circumstances and seriousness of the acts. Thus the Memorandum incorporates
the extradite or prosecute formula but does so in a more meaningful way
than do the multilateral antiterrorist conventions. Unlike the multilateral
conventions, the Memorandum requires that the accused actually be
tried and not merely be submitted "for the purpose of prosecution."
5. Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other
Offenses, Feb. 15, 1973, United States-Cuba, 24 U.S.T. 737, T.I.A.S. No. 7579.
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At the same time, the Memorandum severely limits the extent to
which the state party where the hijacker arrives may take his motivation
into account in prosecuting him. It provides, in pertinent part, that there
may be taken into consideration:
any extenuating or mitigating circumstances in those cases in which the
persons responsible for the acts were being sought for strictly political reasons and were in real and imminent danger of death without a viable
alternative for leaving the country, provided there was no financial extortion or physical injury to the members of the crew, passengers, or other
persons in connection with the hijacking.8
In 1976 the Memorandum was denounced by Cuba on the ground that
the United States had failed to control anti-Castro terrorists who had
planted a bomb on a Cuban civilian aircraft. Nonetheless, Cuba has continued either to prosecute hijackers or to extradite them to the United
States. I would suggest that the Memorandum is an attempt to meet the
kind of concern that Tom Franck was raising without excusing the acts
of hijacking planes and ships.
Let me come back to the very important question of definition. I agree
absolutely with what Tom Franck suggested-he called it deconstruction-that is, narrowing the scope of the international law of terrorism
to include only particular acts that all decent people find impermissible.
Even under this approach, however, there are currently gaps in the law.
For example, acts that the law of armed conflict regards as terrorism or
war crimes, such as bombings that deliberately target a civilian population with no justification of military necessity, do not fall within the parameters of international law if they occur outside of a situation covered
by the law of armed conflict. The bombing of or the deliberate attacks on
civilians seem to me to pose perhaps the most difficult problem that Tom
Franck identified in his discussion of the distinction between idiots' law
and sophists' law. To illustrate, I assume that South Africa's apartheid
system enjoys little, if any, support in this room. Some persons here may
support a liberation group such as the African National Congress using
force against the government in order to force them to abandon
apartheid. The question I would pose to you is whether targeting of the
South African civilian population by the African National Congress
should be regarded as criminal behavior and subject to penal penalties.
Those who argue that it should not claim that if the cause is just, any
means are acceptable. The law of armed conflict has traditionally rejected this proposition, but it's one that enjoys substantial support among
6. Id. at 738.
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states today.
It is also important to define state sponsorship of terrorism and to
distinguish it from state support. State support of terrorism is a much
broader concept than state sponsorship. One can argue that any country
that fails to fulfill its obligations under the antiterrorist conventions or
any country that generally provides safe haven for people who have engaged in terrorist acts, is lending support to terrorism. But one must
distinguish between such actions and state sponsorship of terrorism
where the state uses terrorism as a tactic to further its interests as it sees
them.
State sponsorship and the issue of how to define terrorism are inextricably intertwined. If you label your adversaries as terrorists and any
country that supports them as sponsoring terrorism, there is no chance
whatsoever of reaching agreement on how to define and deal with terrorism or with the problem of state sponsorship of terrorism. In contrast, if
you define terrorism narrowly and avoid using the term as a political
label to pin on your enemies and agree to prosecute anyone who engages
in such acts, even if you approve of their cause, you may be able to deal
effectively with individual acts of terrorism as well as with states that
sponsor them. So take your favorite liberation group. If, for example,
you support the Contras and Contras engage in these impermissible acts,
you should not only condemn the acts but be willing to prosecute those
responsible for them. The same should be true if members of the African
National Congress or the Irish Republican Army committed the terrorist
acts. In short, there is an overriding need to try, to the extent that we
can, to reach agreement on those acts that we cannot justify as a legal
matter under any circumstances.
I would like to turn now to the question of possible responses to state
sponsorship of terrorism. I think it's important to recognize that although we are talking about legal responses to state sponsored terrorism,
the legal dimension is only part of the picture. The diplomatic, political,
economic and social dimensions are equally if not more important.
Quiet diplomacy is the first option on the least coercive end of the
spectrum. And there is room here for more creative diplomacy. Consider
for a moment Irangate or Contragate. There was nothing inherently
wrong with the United States attempting to approach Iran about the
problem of its sponsorship of terrorism. It would seem appropriate for
the United States to negotiate with Iran over this issue, negotiations that
would necessarily involve some concessions by the United States. The
problem was that it simply made no sense for the Administration to give
arms to Iran in an effort to induce it to stop its sponsorship of terrorism.
If quiet diplomacy doesn't work, public protest may be helpful. The
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larger the number of states that protest, the better. To obtain widespread
condemnation of the acts, we need to have a narrow definition of terrorism. We have to show that the state involved is supporting acts that any
fair-minded individual would regard as impermissible. Moreover, I suggest that such public protests should include an allegation, with supporting analysis, that the state has violated international law as well as general principles of morality. This could add weight to the argument.
The third possible response, which we might couple with public protest, is the bringing of international and transnational claims. International claims might be brought in various forums. They might be
brought in the political bodies more often. It has always struck me as
ironic that the United States usually finds itself iii the United Nations
defending itself against claims brought by states like Libya that sponsor
terrorism. To my knowledge, the United States has not taken the initiative in the United Nations to charge Libya and like-minded states with
sponsoring terrorism. This should be done.
There is also the possibility of some kind of international adjudication.
This could take the form of international arbitration or a suit before the
International Court of Justice. For example, if part of the United States
problem with Libya was truly over the status of the Gulf of Sidra, it is
hard to imagine a more appropriate issue for international arbitration.
However, the United States made no attempts to submit that issue to
international arbitration.
With respect to the International Court of Justice, as you know, the
United States has withdrawn from the court's so-called compulsory jurisdiction. It is still possible, however, for the United States to go before the
Court by reason of special agreement or under compromissory clauses in
multilateral or bilateral treaties. Remember that the United States
brought a successful action against Iran before the International Court of
Justice for actions that one can describe as state sponsored terrorism.'
And it is interesting to note that, at least the last time I looked, the
government of Iran was still a party to two of the treaties and conventions that the Court relied on in that case in assuming jurisdiction,
namely, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents,
and of all things, a United States-Iran Amity and Friendship Agreement.8 Both agreements have compromissory clauses whifh allow one

7. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 180 I.C.J.
3 (Judgment of May 24).
8. Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S.
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party to refer a dispute regarding the agreement to the International
Court of Justice even if the other party to the dispute objects to the
Court's jurisdiction.
We should also give more thought to bringing claims against friendly
states that violate their obligations under applicable treaties. One thinks
of Italy, Egypt and Yugoslovia in the case of the Achille Lauro. According to various reports, France and Italy have been making special deals
with terrorists that allow them to use their territories as bases for attacks
in exchange for promises not to attack French or Italian targets. It would
be worth exploring whether such arrangements violate applicable provisions of treaty law or norms of customary international law.
An example of a transnational claim would be an action in a United
States court, either against a country like Libya or against an organization that is identified as sponsoring terrorist acts, such as the Palestine
Liberation Organization. There have been some cases such as the TelOren case, 9 in which such claims did not succeed, but it is possible that
such claims might succeed in the future. One proposal currently under
consideration, for example, is that we adopt legislation, let's say a variant of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Practices Act, 0 which would
allow civil claims against states and organizations that support terrorism.
The area of economic claims is going to be addressed by Ken Abbott,
and I look forward to his remarks this afternoon. I would make just one
or two comments. First, some of you may be aware of the Bonn Declaration."1 The Bonn Declaration is a political statement that was entered
into in 1978 by the countries participating in the economic summit at
Bonn. It calls for the cutting off of air service between countries that
lend support-that is, by refusing to prosecute or extradite-to terrorists
who hijack airplanes; its scope is limited to the hijacking of airplanes.
The Bonn Declaration, a non-binding political statement, was applied
with some difficulty to Afghanistan in connection with the hijacking of a
Pakistani airliner to Afghanistan. It has not been applied since. It was
not applied against Lebanon in the case of the TWA 847 hijacking, although the United States unilaterally imposed certain sanctions against
Lebanon.
I am not sanguine about the usefulness of military force against states
sponsoring terrorism. The issue posed in law reviews and at conferences

No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular
Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, Iran-United States, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
9. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982).
11. Bonn Declaration on Hijacking of 1978, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1285 (1978).
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I've attended is whether armed force can be justified as an act of selfdefense under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Relatively little
attention has been paid to requirements under the Charter to exhaust all
peaceful means of settling disputes between states. Also, article 27 of the
United Nations Charter provides that if other peaceful means of resolving disputes do not succeed, the parties to the dispute shall refer it to the
Security Council. Disputes over terrorism, to my knowledge, have seldom been referred to the Security Council. In this connection, the Gulf
of Sidra incident is troubling. In my view, the Gulf of Sidra incident
resulted not from a dispute over the freedom of the high seas but rather
from United States designs to provoke a military response by Libya.
This strategy resulted in a variety of violent events and ultimately in the
bombing of that country. Arguably the move of the large United States
fleet into the Gulf of Sidra violated the obligation of the United States
under the United Nations Charter to exhaust all means of peaceful settlement of disputes.
Finally, as some of you may know, Seymour Hersh, in The New York
Times Magazine, claimed that the intent of the Reagan Administration
in the bombing of Libya was to kill Quaddafi.12 That is, the intent was
to hit his tent, which included his wife and various children as well as
Quaddafi. Assuming, arguendo, that the United States could use military force against Libya for its sponsorship of terrorism, the issue arises
whether an intent to kill Quaddafi with the likelihood of killing members of his family as well is consistent with the law of armed conflict.
Thank you very much.

12.

Hersh, Target Qaddafi, N.Y. Times Magazine, Feb. 22, 1987, at 16, col 1.

